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This document is presently being withheld from the

Supreme Court by the Warden of the Utah State Prison.
This occurred because my appeal lawyer, Jay Edmonds,
intercepted this document and refused to turn it over to my
wife, Sally.

Instead, he chose to cripple my Supreme Court

appeal by sending it on December 8th to the warden of a prison
dedicated to interfering with prisoners' access to the courts.
It does so by instructing their contract law firm to
file no action for prisoners and by not letting us have
typewriters or access to copy machines.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Case No.

R'M'F OF "TAH,

:

PETITION FOR

:

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

-vs-

:

Cnu« #89027:1 CA

NEWTON COLLIER ESTES,

:

Category No

Plaintiff-Respondent

Defendant-Appellant•

2

:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should the Supreme Court now decide if gull t y - plea

1)

t • 2 o i i r t t h *\ •

i I * e ii t a t e w J 1 1 n o t c a 11

witnesses nor will they produce any evidence" cause a plea
to become unknowing and thus involuntary when the prosecutor
subsequently presents a seven (7) page J 1st with description of
search warrant evidence and proposed witness hearsay testimony
to the judge? ..u chambers, without the knowledge
the

defendant.
ni

Did the Court of Appeals present a conflict

with decisions of this Court

«i J St n1 H " *tw /

approved the evidence and testimony of Item
received by I,he District Court
HHJI

ilv*i.jree

presented

i ni I

j i ni I II 1

1111 -e 11 1 l n "

IR I I

i above being

in chambers and used to decide
ill l i m i t -

\n

in open c o m I in my presence?

«,i II li 1 i

ii-iterlal

a h a 3 Ill

be

2

b)

Ta Jt an unacceptable departure from di ie

process pi" 1 nc 1 p 1 ea f or !; lie Appeals Court to rule that t !" i,e words
of the Minute Entry aaying I "was present" when t lie evidence of
Statement 1 was presented in chambers constitute proof f hat I
was there an.d ha nil thua voJ untari 1 y wa 1 ved my ri ght a under
77- 18-1(4)?
Instead

II I d

II

m "

"

IIIUPIH • l(

ascertain the truth o£ my claims

r e 0,4:1 , n i a . l t : ,1 1 11 y

I

Motion to Withdraw Guilty

Plea and in my Certificate of Probable Cause wherein I showed 1
ml 111 H

Kill fi«» I"' € * I "1

-

, «f f

reslst the prosecutions' giving any such evidence

o t ~

,<i^e?

I never 1 aid eyes on him that July 12, isas day
I! 1* w o i f s

I (*<• i,'11
2)

I 1 Ihi I »,i. c h a m b e r s .

Has the Court of Appeals departed from your

decisions and £ rom due process requiring U\e»

» he

-uM^^ri *inq

'

a defendant must be based on accurate information by Its
ignoring the sentencing transcript which shows me again and
aqaln

romp I a t n I nq

thinit

t h«F

p r e r - i e n f i-an ;:t=* r e p n r l

was

I ill

•..» I

lies

needing rebut, ta 1, •
3)
Appeal a \ <

la It, not a radical departure for the Court, of
• 1, I *• l„ hat

I

M 1

victim, n o n - v i o l e n t p e r p e t r a t o

,

^

* *«- c o n t e n t s of

the p r e s e n t e n c e report when

resulted in J u d g e Cornaby *s
:

wit h deep-seated

sexual p r o b l e m s mnd with the intent to 1 iave some kind of sexual

3

relationship1* with other children and who thereupon sentenced me
t «i

i 1I e

| ' n I «df"i:«'ij I11

i

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION

On

November

16

}rn\U

If

hai

It> I il<

J

i

nut

for-

publication, opinion i n this caae #890271 -CA rejecting all claims
that my pi eaa were unknowing and involuntary.

JURISDICTIONAL

STATEMENT

The date of entry of Court of Appeals opinion
November 16, 1989.

1s

My Motion for Extension c

of Certiorari to the Supreme Court was prior to December 18th
and was mailed to the Supreme Court.

Geoffrey

. Butler

of the Supreme Court,, to J d my • i f e,

Set.] 1 y , a ' er

.-" I erk
•

at

Associate Chief Justice Howe had granted the Motion for
Extension

in accordance with rule 45e; however, I do net yet

have a copy of the

UHIMI

, iu I iln mil

IN

w II I i dn\\H.

This petit ion for Writ of Certiorari J .a based on
) i ,i r I s d i c 1 1 <' r in i"" i: i if"i f e i: i e cl b y
Utah Supreme Court.

I: :1 I: I • i \ '" 1 R it 1 e

• 12 o I: t h e R u 1 e a o £ th e
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner pleaded guilty on July 12, 1988 to
attempted* aggravated (by her being a part-time servant) sexual
abuse of a child and to dealing in material (letting her see
Plavbov) harmful to a child.

I was sentenced to concurrent

terms of five to life and zero to five respectively, and fined
more than $5,000.00.
After my Motion to Withdraw my Guilty Plea and my
Supreme Court application for a Certificate of Probable Cause
were denied, I appealed.
The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow my plea to be
withdrawn because they said I should have known that "no
evidence" would be presented meant that it really would be; that
two words in the Minute Entry proved I was in chambers to
approve submission of damaging evidence; that I never asked to
rebut the presentence report and that its contents did not hurt
me.

«to not be faced with "minimum mandatory"

diligence would

preclude

an appeal

based

on i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s

of

counsel.
b)

The

Vanderlinden

asked

which

said

he had

sign#

To have

original

first

Namba

me to sign
would

not

recommended

contained

I plead

it was not worth

his secretary

prepared

example
copy

to the

it would

affidavit

of June

21st

was endorsed

warrant

and which

charges

I refused

to virtually

me to receive

his time

be hard

to read

to find

counsel

than

which

d)
very worried
oppose

all

to

the

a maximum

the

document

a more

flagrant

is represented

by a

I possess and will

to have me meet

the p r o s e c u t o r f s

presented

to the judge.

I wanted

bargain

would

by the Kaysville
by

not

offer

charges,

to read

Police

him

in Court

motion?

He stated

I came

the next

or s u g g e s t i o n ?

he felt

after

to Court

record.
-5-

had
the

Department.

him,

in J u l y ? , V a n d e r l i n d e n

evidence

into the

affidavit

be shown

phoned

me

day

help

or

me w h i c h ) to have the search warrant

such damaging

to reduced

held

Sometime

told

plea

by the Court, Steve Vanderlinden

statement

(he never

present

the corrected

that Judge Cornaby

evidence

This was an e r r o n e o u s

him

serious

Steve

signature.

I rejected

Before

my w i f e , Sally,

search

affidavit

Court.
c)

told

for my

of lack of effective

of that

many

guilty

he wanted

s e n t e n c e , or that

I submit

bargain

be included,

charges means either

had

plea

they

accepting

had

to

whatever

evidence
no right

my guilty

with a prepared

to

plea

statement

Vanderlinden
Namba,

and

ten-minute

e)

While waiting

oppose

the motion,

Adult

Probation

meeting

and

in the court
I observed

room

him,

Parole Officer

just outside

the court

to help

prosecutor

Judy

Brian

Valeika

room on the

in a

second

floor•
As soon as they
me to say
problem
that

there had

I know

been a meeting

was resolved,

point

now he meant

without

to the agreement
evidence

theirs

with

(at the whim

Such a meeting

shortly

that

Judy
aware

house.

favor, not

At
theirs

was presented

of

judge and

to

evidence

matter, or

judge

he sentenced

is tantamount

the

consent

receiving

me up to

life

Pardons).

to a conspiracy

rights and makes my

to

present

illegal.

_ -g ^_—
first

that

to

thereafter.

in the

of the Board

deprive me of my C o n s t i t u t i o n a l
restraint

came over

and

in our

as to subject

resulted

so incriminating

imprisonment

resolved

the prosecutor,

my knowledge
reached

in chambers

since all evidence

Valeika

meeting

Vanderlinden

for me to leave the court

he meant

by Judy

That
gatherer

and

I believed

Judge Cornaby

adjourned,

f)

I phoned

interview with
Valeika

Vanderlinden

the Adult

to ask him

Probation

the evening
and

if there was anything

Parole

before my
Department's

I should

of.
His answer

was to "Tell
-6-

her

the whole

truth".

be made
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

1)

On Friday, July 15, 1988, I learned from AP&P

investigator, Judy Valeika, that late that day she had given
Judge Cornaby the biggest presentence report ever compiled in
Davis County <R.48) which contained the reasons for life
imprisonment but which I had a right to examine.

I thereupon

prepared a Notice of Appeal (R.34) to present at the Tuesday,
July 19th sentencing.

It stated how I had been misled at Plea

Bargain <T1 page 10 lines 18 and 19) by the courts' statement
that no evidence or testimony would be presented to Judge
Cornaby.

See also Memorandum in Support of Probable Cause <R.71

pages 5 and 6 and Addendum #3 2/7/89).
One half hour before sentencing was scheduled, my
lawyer handed me the huge report.

From this cursory review I

saw it was full of outright lies, rumors and innuendoa.

I then

hand wrote on my typed notice, "lies heavily solicited by Judy
Valeika** and presented it to the Court during sentencing.
I never had seen or even heard about the two
prosecution documents called "Notice of Intent to Present
Evidence and to Use Hearsay Testimony" <R.4S) till eight monthls
later when Supreme Court Clerk, Geoff Butler, sent the
presentence report to me in prison.

6

a)

On July 12, 1988, one week prior to

sentencing, I waa aummoned to Farmington courthouae by my lawyer
to help him oppoae the prosecutor's preaentation of "Playboy"
and other aearch warrant evidence to the judge in hia chambers.
These documents are contained as appendixes in Brief of
Appellant and Brief of Respondent.
1988.

Namba dated them July 6,

After a half hour wait during which I aaw Namba, my

lawyer and Judy Valeika confer in the aecond floor lobby,
Venderlinden told me to go back to work that, "All had been
taken care of".
court documenta:

Thia acenario waa aet forth in the following
on page 5 and 6 of my 9/8/88 Memorandum in

Support of Habeaa Corpua and 12/31/88 Memorandum in Support of
Probable Cause (R.71 item a page 16).
Aa a reault, highly inflammatory, damaging
information was presented to the judge that I never saw till I
waa aeven montha in priaon, but which formed a major baaia for
hia giving me life impriaonment in lieu of probation.
b)

On July 12, 1988, becauae of the facts aet

forth in item a) above, the Diatrict Court cauaed a Minute Entry
be placed in the file, (see addendum in Appellant'a Brief) that
aaid I waa present during Namba'a presentation.

The Appeala

Court cited thia entry aa proof I saw and approved the documenta
and thereby gave up my right to confront and rebut their
contents in open court.

7

2)

During the July 19, 1988 sentencing hearing

(T2) I

challenged again and again the accuracy of the preaentence
report and claimed I ahould have a right to rebut it.

On page 3

linea 18 thru 22 my lawyer aaid I wanted to challenge the
atatement of the neighborhood collateral contacta.

On page 3

llnea 10 thru 16 I waa ahown to want to challenge harmful
innuendoa about taking neighborhood boya akiing.

On page 3

linea 18 and 19 I waa ahown to believe alleged statements of
parenta were not true.

On page 4 llnea 13 and 14 I waa ahown to

llnea 9 thru 11 I aald the collateral contact recapa contained
aolicited innuendoa rather than genuine opinions.

On page 11

llnea 20 thru 25 and following. I aaid the interview reporta had
been deliberately twiated to suggest wrongdoing. On page 12
llnea 5 thru 11 I state the innuendoa lead to the exact opposite
of the truth and need to be subjected to rebuttal.
All these complainta were based on reviewing less
than 1/5 of the report.

When finally sent me by Supreme Court

Clerk, Geoff Butler, I spent 2 daya analyzing the whole report
and writing ten <10) pages of rebuttal I hoped to get into the
record at some stage.

8

Of all

the neighborhood collateral contacts, not

one said they knew of a single instance of even a suggestion of
specific sexual misconduct.

This bottom line conclusion was,

for reasons best known to Judy Valeika, never articulated or
even hinted at.

She overwhelmed this basic conclusion with

thirty <30) pages of rumors and innuendos about my power to
manipulate children, neighborhood fears, and that I had intent
to commit other sexual crimes.
After all these neighborhood and my
daughters'interviews failed to show any kind of sexual
misconduct, Ms. Valeika, during the week of July 10th, informed
me that the AP&P needed some serious instance of past sexual
misconduct or else I could not be recommended for treatment on
the outside, but would have to be incarcerated for willful
inexcusable sexual misconduct.

I invented a story <T2 lines 11

thru 1 6 ) .
This is the background of her report on me on page
14 next to last paragraph

<R.48) that caused Judge Cornaby's

rebuttal to my claim of a clean past that I had indeed molested
a girl 39 years ago <T2 page 6 line 24 thru page 7 line 2 0 ) .
3)

The unrebutted misinformation of the presentence

report plus the secret inflammatory information presented by the
prosecutor to the judge resulted in great harm to me at

9

sentencing as can be judged by the following remarks of Judge
Cornaby's contained in the sentencing transcript

<T2):

page 3

line 23 thru page 4 line 11 he says I would be able to change
witnesses' true stories into untrue ones if he allowed me to
examine them.

He accuses me of writing my wife's letter to him

and gets called a liar by the one who was with her when she
wrote it.

(See also T3 page 9 lines 19 thru 2 5 ) .
Page 9 lines 2 thru line 9 page 10 he concludes my

hitting Justice White (who was not injured) was a prior act of
violence rather than one of civil disobedience.
Page 13 lines 7 thru 11 he uses the unrebutted
presentence report to overrule Dr. Roby's ISAT 8-page
psychological exam report (R.4S) that testing ••
did not indicate that he suffers from
the same degree of psychopathology which
the vast majority of those assessed for
similar offenses do.•.Cand3 fails to
suggest any underlying major affective
or characterological disorders to which
Newt's sexually illicit behavior may be
attributed.••Cand] Newt appears a much
less pathological picture than most
offenders this examiner has evaluated...
[and it would be this examiner's
recommendation that Newt not be
incarcerated at either Utah State Prison
or Utah State Hospital since he does not
appear to need the intensity of
treatment or supervision such facilities
provide...Cand3 this examiner feels, in
this case, it might be best to require
Newt Estes to successfully complete an
outpatient program. . . ••

10

Page 14 line 20 thru line 7 page 15 Cornaby
inatead aaya I am a high risk offender who tries to replace
parental relationahipa because I have an intent to have aex with
them and that I have long had deep-seated sexual problems.
Page 15 linea 15 thru 18 aaya I hit Justice White
because that Court would not protect me from my own weaknesses whereaa I acted on the fact that it waa tyranny to deprive local
governments of their right (should they desire to do so) to
promote the general welfare as had always been done in the past
by most non-seaport communities.

ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT

1)

It was a violation of constitutional rights to due

process to be told at guilty plea that the State would not
present any evidence or testimony because it thereupon went
ahead and presented all this evidence and other material which
would not have been admissable at trial.
To have used all this evidence to determine the
defendant's punishment while preventing him from even learning
of the contenta ao he could rebut them is an unspeakable assault
on due process.

11

The district judge ahould have aaid at plea
bargain that there would be no formal evidence or aworn
teatimony but thia aame information could be received by the
aentencing Court to help it determine degree of guilt.
a & b)

If an Appeala Court ia allowed to rule

that a defendant haa given up hia 77-18-1<4) atatutory right to
hear and challenge damaging aentencing information on the baaia
of 2 worda in a Minute Entry, it in eaaence ia given licenae to
nullify the fair application of the law.

I aubmlt a defendant

can only be assumed to have waived thia right by hia aignature
on the documenta in queation that he underatanda their contenta
and needa not have them recited at aentencing.
2)

The Appeala Court haa approved removal of the

aafeguarda that aentencing ahould be baaed upon information
which haa had
accuracy.

GLII

opportunity to have been teated for reaaonable

It haa endoraed a procedure whereby the diatrict

court not only makes no effort to inquire if the aentencing
report haa been examined for groaa errors, but inatead rejects
and ridiculea apontaneoua complainta about how all the liea need
anawerlng.

12

To have aentencing baaed on accurate information,
aa due proceaa would aeem to require, means the judge must
aacertain if both aidea agree aa to the accuracy of ita contenta
by asking thoae kinda of queationa.
3)

When an Appeala Court rulea that the appellant haa

shown no injury stemming from a presentence report be challenged
in Court aa being "full of Ilea" merely because hia lawyer
refused his request to file an answer to respondent's brief, it
haa made a deliberate attempt to avoid conaidering the obvioua
truth, namely that injury and prejudice ahould be aasumed when
the tranacript ahowa many complaints after which a first-time,
non-violent, aingle event, aingle victim 63-year-old defendant
ia aentenced to a career-ending life imprisonment in lieu of
being given probation.
Theae aame unanawered lies will alao be uaed to
deny parole again and again.
When auch reaults can come from a traitoroua
lawyer's failure to answer a response, the Appeals Court has no
right to assume the oppoaite from the obvious.

13

CONCLUSION
Trial courts should be required to have a defendant
understand the sentencing process, and then to ascertain if he
knows the contents of the documents involved.

A judge would

then be less inclined to overrule the State Psychiatrist and
imprison a man for life for a supposed intent to commit further
crimes•
If I had been so informed, a lack of intent would
easily have been shown as the only explanation why Valeikafs
search could not turn up one other victim.

Only this lack can

explain why the uncanny ability to dominate and the inordinate
opportunity to do so, for which I was condemned, resulted in not
one other occurrence.
Dated this ZJcJdaj

of J anuary, 1990.

NEWTON COLLIER ESTES

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3k^J;day

of January, 1990,

I hand delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney
General of the State of Utah, 236 Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, UT

84114.

Saljly

E§/fces,

Wife of Defendant-Appellant

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

N O W 61989

OOOoo
State of Utah,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Case No. 890271-CA

Newton Collier Estes,
Defendant and Appellant.

Second District, Davis County
Honorable Douglas Cornaby
Attorneys:

Jay D. Edmonds, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Croft.1
CROFT, Judge:
This appeal is from the trial court's denial of appellant's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to a two-count information*
We affirm.
Appellant pleaded guilty to a first-degree felony of
attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child and to a
third-degree felony of dealing in material harmful to a child.
After reviewing a presentence report prepared by the Department
of Corrections, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms
of five years to life and zero to five years on the two charges.
A few months later, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas,
but his motion was denied and he appeals from that denial.

1. Bryant H. Croft, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.
1989).

Appellant contends the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas was an abuse of the trial courtfs discretion. He
asserts his motion should have been granted because of the
court's failure to (1) to advise him that by pleading guilty he
was waiving his right to confront and to cross-examine, the
witnesses against him, and (2) afford him an opportunity to
present information to rebut the presentence report and to
require the prosecuting attorney to submit the information and
evidence in open court, on the record, and in appellant's
presence at the time of sentencing as required by law.
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be
reversed only when it clearly appears the trial court has
abused its discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424
(Utah 1987); State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah App.
1988) .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-ll(e) (Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e))
provides, among other things, that the court shall not accept a
guilty plea until the court has made findings "that the
defendant knows he has rights against compulsory
self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and
cross-examine in open court the witnesses against him, and that
by entering the plea he waives all of those rights."
Appellant alleges there is nothing in the record to show
that when he entered his guilty pleas, he was informed of his
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the witnesses
against him, nor is there any reference thereto in the
affidavit he signed with respect to such pleas.
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), our
supreme court said: "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule
11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered."
In Vasilacopulos.- this court said trial courts may not rely
on defense counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy the
specific requirements of Rule 11(e), and that, "[r]ather, with
or without an affidavit or defense counsel's advice, the trial
court must conduct an on-the-record review with the defendant
of the Rule 11(e) requirements. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d at 94•
The use of an affidavit in the guilty plea processes is not
required under our law. Thus, if used, what it does or does
not contain is not controlling. The appellate court must

890271-CA
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review the record of the plea proceedings to determine if the
trial court met those requirements.
The record discloses appellant entered his guilty pleas on
June 21, 1988, in open court with his counsel present, during
which the court advised appellant he would be waiving a trial
either by the court or before a jury by pleading guilty, to
which appellant responded that he so understood. The court
then advised appellant that he had a right to require the state
to call witnesses and by those witnesses to prove each element
of the offense charged against him in each of the two separate
counts, to which the appellant again responded that he so
understood. The court went on to say that the state would not
call any witnesses nor produce any evidence before the court if
"you plead guilty. Do you understand that?" Again, an
affirmative reply was given.
The requirements of Rule 11(e) may be shown to have been
met by what the trial court said to a defendant. The use of
the exact wording of the rule is not mandated by our law or
controlling appellate court decisions. We find that telling
the appellant he had the right to require the state to call
witnesses and by those witnesses prove each element of the
charges against him effectively disclosed to him his rights to
confront and to cross-examine the witnesses who would have been
called had appellant elected to be tried. We therefore
conclude that the trial court complied sufficiently with Rule
11(e).
At the time appellant entered his guilty pleas and their
acceptance by the court, the trial judge stated he would prefer
a presentence report, to which appellant agreed. Appellant was
then advised by the court that he was to go to the Department
of Corrections, and that he should immediately make an
appointment "to provide them with information." Appellant did
so, and an extensive presentence report was prepared by the
Department of Corrections and submitted to the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (1989) provides:
(a) Prior to the imposition of any
sentence the court may, with the concurrence
of the defendant, continue the date for the
imposition of sentence . . . for the purpose
of obtaining a presentence investigation
report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the
defendant
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(b) At the time of sentence, the court
shall hear any testimony or information the
defendant or the prosecuting attorney
desires to present concerning the
appropriate sentence. This testimony or
information shall be presented in open court
on record and in the presence of defendant*
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-22(a) (1982) states:
Before imposing sentence the court
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to
make a statement in his own behalf and to
present any information in mitigation of
punishment/ or to show any legal cause why
sentence should not be imposed. The
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an
opportunity to present any information
material to the imposition of sentence.
The presentence report reflects that appellant and members
of his family were extensively interviewed. Appellant
furnished over thirty letters and documents to the probation
agent for inclusion in the report and submission to the court.
The report contained information obtained by the probation
agent from various persons, some favorable, some unfavorable.
An extensive psychological evaluation was made, and concluded
with the psychiatrist pointedly recommending that appellant not
be incarcerated.
The record reflects that on the day of sentencing, July 19,
1988, appellant and his counsel received a copy of the
presentence report and spent an hour reviewing it. It was made
a part of the court record.
Prior to sentencing, the prosecuting attorney submitted to
the court and appellant two written documents dated July 5,
1988, one entitled "Sentence Recommendation," in which it was
stated the prosecutor would recommend consecutive prison
sentences and set forth his reasons for doing so. The second
was entitled "Notice of Intent to Present Evidence and to Use
Hearsay Evidence" in which the prosecutor stated he intended to
call as witnesses at the sentencing hearing the mother of the
victim and the investigating police officer. A summary of the
expected testimony of each was provided, with reference to
several pornographic photos and a tape of an interview with
appellant.

890271-CA

4

A minute entry dated July 12/ 1988, discloses that on that
date appellant and counsel appeared before the court; that the
prosecutor and defense counsel met in chambers with the court;
that the prosecutor's Sentence Recommendation and Notice of
Intent to Present Evidence had been filed; that the prosecutor
there agreed that said documents would not be placed in the
court's official file but would be left with the court for
consideration at the time of sentencing; that copies would be
given to the Department of Corrections/ and contained the
statement/ "The court grants the motion." It is apparent from
the minute entry that this agreement was initiated by appellant
and his counsel.
At the sentencing hearing, the two witnesses did not
testify/ and nothing further was said about those two
documents. Appellant contends the fact that they were included
in the presentence report resulted in the prosecutor getting
the information included therein to the court contrary to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (1989). The court already had them for
consideration pursuant to the understanding reached at the July
12 hearing.
Appellant contends that statute requires that any
sentencing materials be presented orally/ "presumably" either
by testimony or by the prosecutor's oral statement on the
record. A presentence report is statutorily a part of the
sentencing procedures and the suggestion that its contents must
be presented in open court either orally by the prosecution or
through witnesses called to testify concerning its contents is
without
merit.
Appellant cites cases requiring the materials in a
presentence report to be disclosed to a defendant. Such was
done in this case. Appellant contends that implicit in such
rulings is the principle that a defendant must have a chance to
rebut matters contained in the report. There is nothing in the
record to show appellant could have done so.
Appellantfs statutory right was to make a statement on his
own behalf and to present information in mitigation of
punishment. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-22(a) (1982). At the time
of sentence, the court "shall hear any testimony or information
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning sentence." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (1989).
Appellant met with the probation officer/ furnished extensive
information about himself and details concerning the crimes
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committed, and submitted numerous letters from family,
employers/ neighbors, and friends favorable to himself, all of
which was included in the report. The record discloses
appellant made his statement to the court but had no other
testimony to present.
Appellant was disturbed by what he read in the presentence
report of unfavorable comments made by some neighbors, and
stated to the court he did not believe those neighbors truly
felt that way about him. He contends their comments were being
used against him without his having any chance to rebut them.
His counsel stated appellant "feels that if he could talk to
them they wouldnft be that way."
Appellant interprets this comment of counsel as a request
to the court for additional time to allow appellant to talk to
such persons. The court's response to the comment was that
appellant was a "very domineering individual" and that "he
wants to sit down and talk with them because he wants to
persuade them to be the way he wants them to be." Appellant's
brief suggests nothing to indicate such endeavor would have
been successful. Neither appellant nor his counsel made any
specific request for continuance of the sentencing hearing.
Appellant in his brief recites the courtfs comment at the
time he entered his guilty pleas to the effect that "The state
will not call any witnesses nor will they produce any evidence
before the court if you plead guilty." It is argued that
appellant took this literally and as an assurance that, by
pleading guilty, he could thereby prevent the sentencing judge
from hearing or otherwise knowing any of the inflammatory
evidence relating to his alleged crimes, believing the "State"
included not only the prosecutor but also the Department of
Corrections presentence investigators. The quoted statement
was made as the trial judge was advising appellant concerning
the effects of waiving a trial by pleading guilty. The court
already had the "inflammatory evidence" from the information,
the probable cause statement included therein, appellant's own
affidavit executed and filed with the court when his guilty
pleas were entered, and the court was certain to receive the
presentence report authorized by statute.
Thus, we find nothing in the sentencing process that
constituted a denial of appellant's constitutional or statutory
rights. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas. The judgment is affirmed.

H. Crort, Judge

n

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN, BUT
SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT, I.E., IS A PLEA
VOLUNTARY IN LIGHT OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S BELIEF THAT
SUCH A PLEA WOULD PROTECT THE DETAILS OF HIS ALLEGED
CRIMES FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY AFTER THE COURT PROMISED THAT
THE STATE WOULD PRESENT NO EVIDENCE;

WHAT MUST THE

COURT ACTUALLY DO TO INFORM A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT OF HIS
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE A WITNESS;

WHAT CONSTITUTES A

REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT TO
PRESENT INFORMATION REBUTTING AN INCORRECT PRESENTENCE
REPORT;

IS THE STATE REQUIRED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE

INTENDED FOR USE AT SENTENCING IN OPEN COURT, ON THE
RECORD, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT.
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court
below (C.A. NUMBER 890271-CA, November 16, 1989) pursuant to Rule 42,
Rules Of The Utah Supreme Court.

V

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Newton C. Estes pleaded guilty to a first degree felony of attempted
aggravated sexual abuse of a child and to a third degree felony of dealing in
material harmful to a child. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Estes
to concurrent terms of five years to life and zero to five years respectively.
Estes subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas but his motion was
denied and he appealed.
The case was assigned to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
court's decision.
Estes now seeks Supreme Court review of the Court of Appeals1 decision.

VI

ARGUMENT
I.

A PLEA IS NOT VOLUNTARY IN LIGHT OF A CRIMINAL

DEFENDANT'S BELIEF THAT SUCH A PLEA WOULD PROTECT THE
DETAILS OF HIS ALLEGED CRIMES FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY AFTER
THE COURT PROMISED THAT THE STATE WOULD PRESENT NO
EVIDENCE.
A guilty plea must be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. State
v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). Estes makes the argument that
his guilty plea was not intelligently made due to his mistaken reliance on the
literal meaning of the trial court's statement that "no" evidence would be
presented if a guilty plea was entered. Evidence was however presented -at—

seateaeing: i^^^A
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While The Utah Supreme Court has addressed issues surrounding a plea of
guilty, Estes avers this is a unique twist to such an issue. How literally can the
average criminal defendant interpret the judge's comments during the plea
hearing? Since Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and its progeny,
were no doubt designed to protect defendants from unknowingly or
unintelligently entering guilty pleas, further study of this issue is warranted. See
also; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

1

II. THE SENTENCING COURT MUST ACTUALLY INFORM CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS OF THEIR RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES.
A review of the record below indicates that the court never specifically
informed Estes of his right to "confront and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him." The Court of Appeals ruled that a cursory explanation,
outside the information used in the plea affidavit, was sufficient to meet the
requirements of Rule 11(e). It should be noted that this decision seems to be in
conflict with this Court's decision in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987).
In Gibbons, the Court found that such affidavits " . . . should list
individually and specifically the rights waived by the entry of the guilty plea."
Id. at 1313.
III.

ESTES DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO

PRESENT INFORMATION REBUTTING AN INCORRECT PRESENTENCE
REPORT.
The record shows that Estes and counsel received the pre-sentence report
the day of sentencing. Exercising his rights pursuant to §77-35-22(a), U.C.A.,
Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and §77-18-1(4), U.C.A., Estes,
through his lawyer, requested additional time to interview persons allegedly
spoken to by the presentence investigator. The request was denied by way of a
speech uttered from the bench. The fact that the request was made satisfies the
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need under Utah law to object to an inaccurate presentence report. See: State v.
Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980).
More importantly, it is well settled in Utah and by the federal courts that
criminal defendants are entitled to receive accurate presentence reports. See:
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985) and State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241,
1246 (Utah 1980). See also: Dorsyznski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431
(1974) and Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980). Estes received neither
sufficient time to review the presentence report, or an accurate presentence
report.
IV. THE STATE IS REQUIRED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE INTENDED
FOR USE AT SENTENCING IN OPEN COURT, ON THE RECORD, AND IN
THE PRESENCE OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT.
Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and §77-18-1(4),
U. C.A. govern the submission by the prosecution of testimony, evidence or other
information concerning the imposition of the appropriate sentence.
The statute specifically requires:
"This testimony or information shall be presented in
open court on record and in the presence of the
defendant." §77-18-1(4), U.C.A.
As noted below, the prosecution prepared two documents which were
never actually legally "filed." They were somehow made an unofficial part of the
record pursuant to a minute entry according to the Court of Appeals. (See
Appendix "A", pp. 4-5)
3

Regardless of the method used by the trial court to gain access to the
prosecutor's sentencing wishes, or the method used by the Court of Appeals to
justify the use of these documents, the fact still remains that a court rule,
presumably prescribed by the Supreme Court, was ignored.

Documents

containing evidence and information relevant to the sentencing were not
presented in open court and made an official part of the record, in the presence
of the Defendant, as required by both statute and rule. The Court of Appeals
decision with regard to this obvious anomaly is in direct conflict with all
established statutory precedents.
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CONCLUSION
Certiorari should be granted because the Court of Appeals decided issues
which are actually questions of first impression, or in conflict with other Utah
Supreme Court decisions or approved rules and as such, are issues more suited to
resolution in the Supreme Court.
This case provides the Court with the proper vehicle for determining the
rights and responsibilities of criminal defendants and prosecutors in such cases.
Due to the Petitioner's age, he faces what amounts to natural life in prison
and consequently, this case is serious enough to warrant further review.

Respectfully submitted,

Newton C. Estes, Pro se
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